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Knowing how without knowing that
Ian Harmon 
1.0 Introduction 
Intellectualism is the view that knowing how to do something amounts to 
lmowing that something is the case. Anti-intellectualism is the view that knowing how 
consists in certain sorts of abilities or dispositions. In this paper I offer arguments against 
two versions of intellectualism. Stanley and Williamson (2001) hold that propositional 
knowledge is both necessary and sufficient for know-how. Against their view, I argue 
that there are cases in which such knowledge is insufficient. Bengson and Moffett (2012) 
argue that propositional knowledge is necessary, but not sufficient for know-how. Rather, 
they hold that knowing how requires meeting a further condition, namely, standing in a 
non-propositional knowledge-of relation to a way of doing something. Against this view, 
I argue that if propositional knowledge is necessary for know-how, then we must deny 
that many clear instances of know-how are in fact such instances. Taken together, my 
cases against Stanley and Williamson and Bengson and Moffett show that propositional 
knowledge is neither necessary nor sufficient for know-how. 
2.0 Stanley and Williamson on know-how According to Stanley and Williamson (hereafter, S&W): 
S knows how to X if and only if 
(a) for some way, w, S knows that w is a way for S to X and
(b) S entertains the proposition that w is a way for S to X under a practical mode
of presentation. 
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